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Abstract
Byrne and Hall (1999) criticized the argument of Chalmers (1996) in favor of the
Everett-style interpretation. They claimed to show “the deep and underappreciated
flaw in any Everett-style interpretation”. I will argue that it is possible to interpret
Chalmers’s writing in such a way that most of the criticism by Byrne and Hall does
not apply. In any case their general criticism of the many-worlds interpretation is
unfounded. The recent recognition that the Everett-style interpretations are good
(if not the best) interpretations of quantum mechanics has, therefore, not been
negated.
1. Introduction. It is probably impossible to present an interpretation of quantum
mechanics in unambiguous way without writing equations. Chalmers’s presentation of
Everett-style interpretation also can be understood in different ways. Instead of equa-
tions Chalmers used some technical jargon of quantum theory, however, some words like
“substates” have no clear meaning even for physicists. Byrne and Hall (BH) interpreted
Chalmers’s jargon in a way which leads to contradictions. In this note I will argue that by
taking a more positive approach, one can see in Chalmers’s writing a consistent (although
not necessarily very persuasive) argument.
In the second part of their paper BH claimed to show not only that Chalmers has
failed to establish his Everett-inspired interpretation, but that “anything resembling it
should not be taken seriously”. Their first point is of a general character: if the spaces
of states in two theories are identical but the dynamics is not, it is not obvious that the
interpretation of these states in the two theories must be identical too. BH point out that
this is the situation regarding the interpretation of quantum states in the orthodox and
the Everett interpretations. I will argue that although their general argument is correct,
its application is not. There is enough similarity between the dynamics that makes the
identification plausible. The second point of BH is that the Everett-style interpretation
has less “substantive content” than the orthodox interpretation. This is because in the
Everett (many-worlds) interpretation there is no counterpart of “outcome probabilities”,
the concept of the orthodox interpretation associated with a system in a superposition
of eigenstates of some variable. I will argue that the definition of the probability of an
outcome in the framework of the many-worlds interpretation which I recently proposed
solves this difficulty and makes this BH criticism obsolete.
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The organization of this note is as follows. In Section 2 I will adopt the BH in-
terpretation of Chalmers and will show (in a different from BH way) how it leads to a
contradiction. In Section 3 I propose an alternative interpretation of Chalmers’s writing
which leads to a consistent argument. In Section 4 I critically analyze the general argu-
ments of BH against the Everett-style interpretations. Finally, in Section 5 I summarize
my defense of the many-worlds interpretation.
2. Byrne and Hall interpretation and a contradiction in the Chalmers argu-
ment. The central thesis of Chalmers quoted by BH is the principle of organizational
preservation under superposition:
OPUS
“If a computation is implemented by a system in a maximal physical state
P , it is also implemented by a system in a superposition of P with orthogonal
physical states.”(Chalmers, 350)
Consider a simple model: a computer which performs calculations in a classical way. If at
time t0 the computer receives a classical input (a particular punching of its keyboard), then
it evolves in time is such a way that it is always in a “classical” state. This means that all
the registers of the computer at all times are in some definite states (exited or not exited)
i.e., not in a superposition of excited and not excited. Suppose that P corresponds to a
computation of a square of a number 5, while Q corresponds to a computation of a square
of a number 10. Denote |P (t)〉 a quantum state of the computer at time t performing
the calculation of the square of 5, while |Q(t)〉 a quantum state of the computer at time
t performing the calculation of the square of 10. In the two computations at any time
the registers must be in different states, therefore, |P (t)〉 is orthogonal to |Q(t)〉. Thus,
according to OPUS the computer in a quantum state
|R+(t)〉 ≡ 1/
√
2(|P (t)〉+ |Q(t)〉), (1)
also implements computation of the square of 5. The quantum state
|R−(t)〉 ≡ 1/
√
2(|P (t)〉 − |Q(t)〉), (2)
is orthogonal to |R+(t)〉. BH read Chalmers in such a way that OPUS can be applied to
|R+(t)〉 and |R−(t)〉, i.e., that the superposition 1/
√
2(|R+(t)〉− |R−(t)〉) also implements
computation of the square of 5. But,
1√
2
(|R+(t)〉 − |R−(t)〉) = 1
2
[(|P (t)〉+ |Q(t)〉)− (|P (t)〉 − |Q(t)〉)] = |Q(t)〉. (3)
The state |Q(t)〉 corresponds to the computation of the square of 10. It corresponds to the
punching of a different input, it has different registers activated during the calculation, it
has different output. Clearly, it does not implement computation of the square of 5.
Applying this direct reading of Chalmers, BH reached somewhat different contradic-
tion which lead them to reject Chalmers’s approach.
3. An alternative interpretation of Chalmers. It is possible to read Chalmers in
another way such that the contradictions of the type described in the previous section do
not arise. Let us make the following modification of the OPUS principle:
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OPUS′
“If a computation is implemented by a system in a maximal physical state
P which is not a superposition, it is also implemented by a system in a super-
position of P with orthogonal physical states”(Chalmers, 350)
This modified principle can be applied to P and Q, but it cannot be applied to R+ and
R− and, therefore, one cannot reach the contradiction described above as well as the
contradictions described by BH.
One might see that OPUS′ is what Chalmers actually had in mind even though he
did not say it explicitly. Indeed, another way to see the difference between OPUS (as
read by BH) and OPUS′ is that in the latter it is required that P corresponds to a single
experience.1 Chalmers’s first definition of the OPUS principle is:
If the theory predicts that a system in a maximal physical state P gives
rise to an associated maximal phenomenal state E, then the theory predicts
that a system in a superposition of P with some orthogonal physical states
will also give rise to E. (Chalmers, 349)
The word “associated” hints that Chalmers meant that there is only one experience (“phe-
nomenal state E” in Chalmers’s notation) corresponding to physical state P .
In fact, BH saw a possibility of reading OPUS as OPUS′. The “(Version of) OPUS”
described in their section 5.2.3 is essentially OPUS′. They rejected this because they
understood that Chalmers denies the existence of preferred basis. BH are correct in their
criticism that without preferred basis there is no way to distinguish between quantum
state which is a “superposition” and a state which is not a “superposition”. Thus, the
modification of OPUS to OPUS′ cannot be done without assuming preferred basis.
We can read Chalmers in such a way that we do not run into inconsistency: Chalmers
only objects to the claim that the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics, i.e.
the Schro¨dinger equation, leads to preferred basis. He cannot object to the existence of
preferred basis, but he views it as arising from his theory of consciousness. This reading
of Chalmers is justified by the following quotations:
Everett assumes that a superposed brain state will have a number of dis-
tinct subjects of experience associated with it, but he does nothing to justify
this assumption. It is clear that this matter depends crucially on a theory of
consciousness. A similar suggestion is made by Penrose (1989): “... a theory
of consciousness would be needed before the many-worlds view can be squared
with what one actually observes” (348)
... last three strategies are all indirect strategies, attempting to explain the
discreteness of experience by explaining an underlying discreteness of macro-
scopic reality. An alternative strategy is to answer the question about experi-
ence directly. (349)
The main difficulty which BH see in putting together the principle of organization
invariance together with OPUS follows from the same misinterpretation of Chalmers. If
there is no preferred basis then they have reasons to say:
1In principle, the quantum state corresponding to a particular experience have a nonzero overlap with
quantum states corresponding to other experiences due to the tails of quantum waves which must exist
because of the uncertainty principle. But these overlaps are so small that they can be neglected in the
discussion.
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... perceptual experience is (more or less) entirely illusory. When you
seem to see a voltmeter needle pointing to ‘10’ your perceptual experience
is probably veridical: the needle (if, indeed, we can sensibly speak of such a
thing) is not pointing to ‘10’ or anywhere else.
However, accepting preferred basis, even if it is defined by the concept of experience itself,
resolves the difficulty: the pointer does point to ‘10’ and in addition, in parallel worlds,
to other values too.
Chalmers claims that his independently motivated theory of consciousness predicts
that even in the world which is in a giant superposition there are subjects who experience
a discrete world. He bases his argument on “the claim that consciousness arises from
implementation of an appropriate computation.” Taking the model of a simple computer
presented above, we can follow (at least approximately) his proof on p. 350. Projection
of the superposed state on “the hyperplane of P” might mean projection of the quantum
state of the computer in a “superposed” state at the initial time on the state corresponding
to the input of calculating square of the number 5 which leads to quantum states of the
various registers at later times corresponding to this calculation. The parallel between the
calculation and experience yields the desired result, but accepting this parallel is relying
on our experience. So, if we read Chalmers as BH do, that he claims to deduce “what the
world is like if the Schro¨dinger equation is all” without the guide of our experience, then
they have a valid criticism. However, Chalmers admits that Schro¨dinger equation cannot
be all:
... the only physical principle needed in quantum mechanics is the Schro¨dinger
equation, and the measurement postulate and other basic principles are unnec-
essary baggage. To be sure, we need psychophysical principles as well, but we
need those principles in any case, and it turns out that the principles that are
plausible on independent grounds can do the requisite work here. (350-351)
I feel that these “independent grounds” are connected with our experience in a stronger
way than one might imagine reading Chalmers. But this fact cannot lead to rejection of
this approach as BH claim.
4. Byrne and Hall against any Everett-style interpretation. BH start their
argument by pointing out that the orthodox quantum theory and the Everett interpreta-
tion formally defined on the same “family of state spaces” and that the difference is only
in dynamics. Then they say that because of the difference in dynamics it does not follow
that the quantum state corresponding to a particular experience in the orthodox theory
will correspond to the same belief (if at any) in the framework of the Everett theory.
This might be considered as a criticism of Chalmers if one reads him saying that
Everett theory predicts what our experiences should be, but usually this connection is
postulated in Everett-style theories. There is a strong motivation for this postulate. The
orthodox theory is defined only on a (tiny) part of the space of all quantum states:
macroscopic quantum systems cannot be in a “superposition states”. The dynamics of
the allowed states between quantum measurements is identical to the dynamics of the
quantum states in the Everett theory. Let us discuss the example analyzed by BH at
the end of p.385. When a state φ is a state of an observer who has the belief that the
measurement outcome was “up” in the orthodox theory, the dynamics will tell that she
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will write “up” in her lab-book. The dynamics of the state φ in the Everett theory leads
to the same action. This justifies considering φ to be a “belief vector” in the Everett
theory too.
BH proceed with their criticism claiming that Everett’s interpretation has less of “sub-
stantiative content” because when a quantum system is in a superposition of eigenstates
with different eigenvalues of some quantity M, the orthodox interpretation associates
probabilities to the various outcomes, while the Everett theory does not.
It is true that there is a difficulty with the concept of probability in the framework
of the Everett-style interpretation. The Everett theory is a deterministic theory and it
does not have a genuine randomness of the collapse of the orthodox interpretation. A
deterministic theory might have the concept of ignorance probability, but it is not easy
to find somebody who is ignorant of the result of a quantum experiment: it is senseless
to ask what is the probability that an observer will obtain a particular result, because
she will obtain all results for which there are a non-zero probabilities according to the
orthodox approach. It seems also senseless to ask what is the probability of the observers
in various branches (these are persons with the same name and the same memories about
events which took place before the measurements, but who live in different branches
corresponding to the different outcomes) to obtain various results, since obviously the
probability to obtain the result “M = mi” in branch “j” is 1 if i = j and it is 0 if i 6= j.
These are not the quantum probabilities we are looking for.
Nevertheless, there is solution for this difficulty (Vaidman 1998, 2000). The splitting
into various branches occurs usually before the time when the observers in these branches
become aware of the outcome of the measurement. (To ensure this we may ask the
observer to keep her eyes close during the measurement.) Thus, an observer in each
branch is ignorant about the outcome of the measurement and she can (while any external
person cannot!) define the the ignorance probability for the outcome of the measurement.
She will do so using standard probability postulate: the probability of an outcome is
proportional to the square of the amplitude of the corresponding branch. Moreover, since
observers in all these branches have identical concept of ignorance probability and since
they all are descendents of the observer who performed the experiment, we can associate
probability for an outcome of a measurement for this observer in the sense that this is
the ignorance probability of her descendents in various branches.
The fact that I have used a probability postulate here does not spoil the argument:
I had to show that substantive content of Everett interpretation is not less than that of
the orthodox interpretation. The latter has the probability postulate as well. What was
done here (and what was not trivial from the beginning) is presenting a way which allows
to define probability in the frame of the many-worlds interpretation.
The last argument of BH relies on their claim that Everett-style interpretation lacks
“statistical algorithm”. Since the ignorance probability defined above generates the same
statistical algorithm as the the orthodox theory, this argument does not hold either.
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5. Conclusions. The main claim of BH is “that any Everett-style interpretation
should be rejected”. The basis of their argument is the observation that neither Chalmers
nor anybody else can answer the question: “What the world is like if the Shro¨dinger
equation is all?” It is true that this question is much more difficult to answer in the
framework of the Everett-style interpretation relative to interpretations which do not
have multitude of worlds. “The world is everything which exist” is not a valid definition.
Moreover, the Shro¨dinger equation itself cannot define the concept of a “world”. The
world is the concept defined by conscious beings and it requires the analysis of the mind-
body connection. Chalmers’s theory of consciousness provides an answer. One might
argue how substantial his answer is, but even if there is no a detailed answer to this
question today, one cannot reject the Everett interpretation. It suffices that Everett’s
theory is consistent with what we see as our world. It is so superior to the alternatives
from the physics point of view, because it avoids randomness and action at a distance
in Nature (e.g., see Vaidman 2000), that it is still preferable in spite of the fact that it
is less satisfactory from the philosophical point of view. Therefore, even if BH were able
to point out a the difficulty in obtaining the interpretation out of the “bare theory” this
would not be enough for rejecting the Everett interpretation. Moreover, I have argued
that the BH have not presented persuasive arguments showing the difficulty. Their first
argument is that it is not obvious that the correspondence between quantum states and
classical properties in the orthodox quantum mechanics can be transformed as it is to
the Everett interpretation. This argument does not take into account the similarity in
dynamics which justifies the identification. Their other arguments rely on the well known
difficulty in the interpretation of probability in the many-worlds interpretation disregard
a recently proposed solution of this difficulty (Vaidman, 1998).
In summary, BH were not able to show a flaw in Everett-style interpretations. The
temptation to appeal to the philosophy of mind in interpreting quantum mechanics, in
particular, the idea that a theory of mind might help rescue from the difficulties with
standard interpretation is still very attractive. Indeed, the Everett-style interpretation
which says that physics is described in full by the Schro¨dinger equation is the most
satisfactory from the physics point of view. What is left is to complete Chalmers’s work,
i.e. to elaborate the connection between the quantum state evolving according to the
Schro¨dinger equation and our experience.
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